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Abstract. As a result of joining the global trend of the monetary 
policy modernization, Romania has adopted the inflation targeting 
strategy in August 2005. Although the implementation conditions have 
been prepared in advance on the background of a medium-term 
disinflation process, the National Bank of Romania (NBR) succeeded in 
reaching the inflation target only in one year (2006). Beyond the 
inevitable difficulties specific to emerging countries, the implementation 
of this strategy, that has proved to be effective even in conditions of 
crisis, was hampered by an unfavourable economic and political 
environment. In this paper, the authors aim to analyse the responses of 
the Romanian banking system to the signals of monetary policy sent by 
the NBR. In order to do this, the dynamics of the non-governmental 
domestic credit and the interest rates channel have been econometrically 
tested. The results of the analysis showed a chaotic growth in lending 
over the last years (2005-2011) in Romania, respectively an 
uncooperative attitude of the commercial banks on reaching the 
objectives of the monetary polic. 
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Introduction 
 
The strategy of inflation targeting, which was introduced in 1990 by the 
Central Bank of New Zeeland as an innovation of the monetary policy 
instruments, is considered by literature and practitioners to be a framework that 
allows central banks to exercise a “constricted discretionarism”, in which the 
role of the nominal anchor is played by the inflation targets. Thus, the inflation 
targeting achieves conciliation between the discipline and the responsibility 
imposed by the rigid rules, on the one hand, and the flexibility allowed by the 
discretionary approach, on the other hand. Beyond the undeniable successes 
achieved by both developed and emerging countries as a result of applying this 
monetary policy strategy, there are a number of difficulties and risks that led to 
missing the inflation target, especially during the first years of implementation. 
The difficulties of applying the inflation targeting strategy are linked to a 
series of minimal conditions that describe the monetary policy framework 
(Mishkin, 2001): 
  a commitment of the institution running the monetary policy to price 
stability as its main objective on long term, and to the inflation target 
achievement. However, many countries practice a flexible inflation 
targeting and give a certain degree of importance to the output stability 
(the macroeconomic outcome) around the potential level and even 
pursue other objectives to some extent; 
  an explicit objective of the monetary policy through the publication of 
numerical targets for inflation rate in a specific time horizon, either as 
points (2 percent annually), or as an interval (1-3 percent), or as a point 
with an accepted error (2 percent ± 1 percentage point); 
  an internal process of decision in which the target variables have a 
prominent role and the central bank sets its instruments (the nominal 
interest rate on short-term) so that the objective is achieved; 
  an increased transparency of the monetary policy and of the 
accountability of the central bank in relation to the achievement of its 
main objectives. Openness and transparency enable the monetary 
policy makers to be publicly accountable for the decisions they take. 
This stimulates them to achieve their goals, increasing the public 
confidence in the central bank and therefore its credibility. 
A high degree of euroization/dollarization may create potential problems 
for the inflation targeting regime: this requires flexible exchange rates, as the 
exchange rate fluctuations are inevitable in this case. Steep depreciations may 
increase the burden of the debt denominated in foreign currency, causing a 
massive damage to the balance sheets of the economic agents and an increase in Inflation Targeting in the Romanian Banking Brushwood 
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the risks associated to a financial crisis. This suggests that emerging market 
economies cannot afford to ignore the exchange rate when setting the monetary 
policy stance in accordance with the inflation targeting strategy, but the role 
that it assigns should be clearly subordinated to the inflation objective 
(Mishkin, 2001). 
One of the problems that the central bank is facing refers to the defective 
control that it has on inflation because of the lags that arise in the transmission 
mechanism of the monetary policy, the uncertainties related to this mechanism, the 
current state of the economy and the future shocks related to it, as well as factors 
that are not related to the monetary policy. The solution proposed for this problem 
involves using inflation forecast as an intermediate target (inflation forecast 
targeting). The use of the inflation forecast targeting implies that the people 
running the central bank should develop a range of possible paths for inflation and 
the GDP deviation, corresponding to different trajectories of the main monetary 
policy instrument (the interest rate) from which the one that leads to a minimized 
variation of the two variables of the loss function will be chosen. 
On the other hand, economic agents react with some delay to the signals sent 
by the central bank, delay that is caused by the check of the information received, 
or by the efforts to review the business plans. From this perspective, an increase in 
the central bank’s credibility is an indispensable requirement to the successful 
implementation of the inflation targeting strategy. Nevertheless, one should not 
overlook the fact that economic agents pursue their own interests, which are not 
always convergent with the interests of the central bank. Of course, this is also true 
in the case of the relationship of the central bank with the commercial banks, which 
leads to a great amount of delays in propagating the effects of the monetary policy 
measures, or it can even cause side effects.  
The empirically proven delay with which the interest rates are adjusted is 
supported by a series of theoretical statements. The first argument assumes that 
banking is facing costs generated by the information asymmetry, which could 
lead to adverse selection phenomena and moral hazard. In case the interest rates 
on credit increase, there is a possibility that banks can attract borrowers with a 
higher risk profile (adverse selection). Concurrently, the entities that counter 
loans are encouraged to choose riskier projects (moral hazard). Therefore, the 
expected income of banks can actually decrease along with the increased 
funding costs when the default probability of the borrowers increases 
sufficiently. In this situation, banks choose not to increase interest rates on 
loans proportional to a shock on the monetary market interest rate, but 
rationalizing the credit supply (credit rationing). 
Furthermore, customers may support the switching costs when they 
choose to change the bank they have been working with. Such costs may be Georgiana Balaban, Dorel Ailenei 
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administrative or they can be related to collecting the information and they are 
also expected to be significant in the markets that are dominated by long-term 
banking relationships and repeated transactions (Sharpe, 1997). According to 
this theory, switching costs contribute to the segmentation of the market, 
reducing the elasticity of the deposit demand/supply depending on the interest 
rate. A low elasticity could introduce in return, ceteris paribus, an asymmetry in 
the transmission of interest rates. The reaction of the interest rates on loans, for 
example, would be stronger in case of an increase in the interbank interest rates 
and weaker if the latter decreases.   
Another argument is that the banks are facing adjustment costs when the 
interest rates of the monetary market change. A bank that aims to maximize the 
profit will make a change in the interest rate on credits only when the 
adjustment costs are lower than those induced by maintaining interest rates 
unchanged. The latter are directly proportional to the elasticity of the demand 
for bank loans, which is lower in markets characterized by a smaller number of 
competitors, greater barriers at the market entry or the absence of non-bank 
financing alternatives or on the external market. Moreover, banks will choose 
not to change the interest rates when they perceive the interest rates variation of 
the monetary market as temporary. 
Leuvensteijn Van et al. (2008), Groppa et al. (2007) emphasize the fact 
that the intensity of competition affects the transmission of interest rates in the 
Euro area. Sander and Kleimeier (2004) conducted a study involving eight 
countries that joined the EU in 2004, and concluded that the transmission 
process is determined by several variables such as the banking market 
concentration, the health of credit institutions, the foreign participation to their 
capital and the monetary policy regime. Based on this result, the authors argue 
that there is a high potential for convergence of the interest rates pass-through 
in these economies in accordance with the convergence progress of the 
macroeconomic financial structure.  
 In Romania, the central bank officially adopted the inflation targeting 
strategy in August 2005. The decision to shift to inflation targeting was adopted 
only after the preconditions specific to this kind of change have been met. The 
main preconditions considered were the following: (i) lowering the annual 
inflation rate below 10 percent, (ii) strengthening the independence de jure and 
de facto of the NBR; (iii) restricting the fiscal dominance and a better 
coordination between the fiscal and the monetary policies; (iv) the recovery and 
strengthening of the banking system and increasing the banking intermediation.  
Nevertheless, the inflation target was reached in only one year (2006), 
while the period 2005-2010 was dominated by failure. It seems that in the 
second semester of 2011 the inflation target might be reached (Figure 1). Inflation Targeting in the Romanian Banking Brushwood 
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Note: Variation band is 1 percentage point around the central target 
Source: NBR. 
Figure 1. Dynamics of the inflationary process in Romania  
according to the targeted interval 
 
Of course, there are many possible explanations regarding the NBR’s 
failure to reach the inflation target. Thus, the levels of the annual inflation 
targets are considered to be set so that they meet the requirements arising from 
both the implementation of the monetary policy in the context of inflation 
targeting strategy and the need to conduct the nominal and real convergence 
process of the Romanian economy. Under these circumstances, there is a 
question arising among specialists - whether one of the obvious reasons for 
missing the target is the very ambitious level to which it has been set. However, 
we should not overlook the fact that the NBR dealt with this dilemma that was 
generated by the increase in the inflationary pressures of the demand, on the 
one hand, and on the other hand, with the amplification of volatile capital 
inflows as a result of allowing the non-residents to access term deposits in Ron.   
Moreover, because Romania is an emergent economy, with many prices 
that are still administered, the prices advance at a higher rate than in the rest of 
the Euro area is a natural process. If inflation targeting around 2% in the Euro 
area can be considered an anchor in the past, for Romania, the choice of target 
can be seen either as an anchor transfer, or a spurt of ambition. The anchor 
transfer is more like a reference to the foreign reality, rather than the Romanian 
one. Furthermore, the NBR influences only part of the consumer basket that it 
aims, which means that in order to force the achievement of the target, it should 
produce deflation in the prices that it can affect. Forcing the process of reducing 
inflation affects economic development (Isar, 2011). Georgiana Balaban, Dorel Ailenei 
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Without exhausting the long list of causes that contributed to the inflation 
target misses, the authors intend to address this problem in terms of the 
relationship between the central bank and the commercial banks. 
 
Methodology 
 
Our analysis focused on the dynamics of the domestic non-government 
credit and the factors that influence it, but also on the interest rate channel. In 
the analysis of the dynamics of the domestic non-government credit we took 
into consideration the lags existent in the monetary transmission mechanism 
and, therefore, in the propagation of the shock effects that appear in the case of 
some endogenous variables, by using an autoregressive form of the econometric 
equation (equation 1). Regarding the interest rates channel, we took into 
account the correlations between the monetary policy interest rate and the 
average commercial banks interest rates, respectively the average interest rates 
for loans in Ron granted on the interbank market (Robor) at different terms (one 
month, three months and twelve months). Given the double direction of the 
transmission channels, we performed Granger causality tests (Tables 2 and 3) to 
identify the direction and intensity of the causal relationship. The null 
hypothesis (H0) of no causal relationship was verified with F-test. The symbols 
and the meaning of the variables used in the econometric analysis are presented 
in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
The variables of econometric model 
CIN  The non-government domestic credit 
M2 Intermediate  money   
RD_PM The  monetary  policy interest rate 
RDA  The average active interest rate applied by credit institutions 
RDP  The average passive interest rate applied by credit institutions 
ROBOR12M, ROBOR3M,  ROBOR1M  (Romanian Interbank Offer Rate) The interest rate of deposits on 
the interbank market 
IPC  The consumer price index 
 
In order to ensure the consistency of the model and of the time series 
stationarity, the variables have been transformed into logarithms and we worked 
with first-order differences. Taking into account the main variables considered 
in the literature as being responsible for the dynamics of the non-government 
domestic credit, we used the following form: 
DL_CIN = C(1) + C(2)DL_M2 + C(3) DL_M2(-1) +  
+ C(4) RDA(-1) + C(5) RD_PM + C(6) RD_PM(-1) + 
+  C(7) DL_IPC + C(8) DL_IPC(-1)                                         (1) Inflation Targeting in the Romanian Banking Brushwood 
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Data 
 
The data used in the econometric analysis correspond to the period 
January 2005 - June 2011, with a monthly frequency (for the analysis of the 
non-government domestic credit growth and testing the causal relationship 
between the monetary policy interest rate and the average commercial banks 
interest rates) and a daily one (for the analysis of the causal relationship 
between Robor rates and the monetary policy interest rate). The econometric 
estimation was made for the period following 2005, as this was the year in 
which the NBR adopted the inflation targeting strategy. In order to test the time 
series stationarity, we used the ADF test (Augumented Dicky Fuller), and in the 
case of the first-order differences the results were positive. 
 
Empirical results  
 
Between January 2005 - June 2011, the non-government domestic credit 
increased more than four times (from less than 50 billion Ron to more than 200 
billion Ron), outpacing the growth of the intermediate money in the second half 
of the interval (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. The evolution of the non-government domestic credit and of the intermediate money 
between January 2005-June 2011 
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The intermediate money variable is the only common influence factor in 
the literature that proved to be econometrically consistent in terms of the 
statistical data in the Romanian economy, and therefore, after successive tests, 
we chose the most consistent econometric estimation (the exogenous variables 
have to be restricted to the most significant group, thus avoiding the 
multicollinearity). 
The econometric estimation: 
 
DL_CIN = 0.0380 + 0.7183 DL_M2 + 0.3281 DL_M2(-1) –  
– 0.0030 RDA(-1)                                                                                 (2) 
 
Considering the results, it is particularly interesting that the influence of 
the monetary policy interest rate is not significant and the average active 
interest rate applied by credit institutions has very little influence. This shows a 
chaotic development of the domestic non-government loans based on the 
excessive stimulation of the consumer credit. That means that NBR and other 
banks in the system adopted divergent positions: 
  Private banks created pressure to relax lending conditions, speculating 
the increasing trend of the population income and developing a wide 
range of lending instruments. 
  NBR has failed to hold back the enthusiasm of credit through the 
monetary policy interest rate (the econometric tests associated with this 
variable are not significant). The high value of the coefficient 
associated with broad money reveals that the growth of the non-
government domestic credit was significantly supported by the 
monetary expansion as well. 
These results made us to test the consistency of the interest rate channel. 
As it can be seen (Figure 3), there is a certain similarity between the dynamic 
forms of the monetary policy interest rate and the average active and passive 
interest rates of the banking system. 
 Inflation Targeting in the Romanian Banking Brushwood 
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Figure 3. Monetary policy interest rate and the average interest rates 
applied by credit institutions 
 
However, considering the dual direction of the causal interactions in such 
a transmission channel, we tested the mutual correlations between the monetary 
policy interest rate and the average interest rates on deposits and credits, applied 
by credit institutions, using the Granger causality tests (Table 2). 
 
Table 2 
The results of the Granger causality tests between the monetary policy interest rate and 
the average interest rates (active and passive) in the Romanian banking system 
Null Hypothesis:  Obs  F-Statistic  Probability 
RDA does not Granger Cause RD_PM  76  0.31949  0.72756 
RD_PM does not Granger Cause RDA  5.03068  0.00905 
RDP does not Granger Cause RD_PM  76  0.92170  0.40255 
RD_PM does not Granger Cause RDP  2.98602  0.05687 
 
It seems that the monetary policy interest rate does not determine (cause) 
the average interest rate on bank deposits. This proves the divergence of the 
credit policy of banks in the system in relation to the objectives of monetary 
policy. Instead, the average interest rate on bank deposits has a significant 
influence on the monetary policy interest rate, as a consequence of the reaction 
that the monetary authority has to the actions of the commercial banks. Similar 
results are also obtained in the case of the correlation between the monetary 
policy interest rate and the average interest rate on loans, with the only 
difference that the response of the NBR to the credit policy of the commercial Georgiana Balaban, Dorel Ailenei 
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banks is much stronger (the null hypothesis is rejected with very high 
probability). This reveals the decision of the monetary authority to hold back 
the expansion of the non-government domestic credit. Thus, the results of 
previous studies in monetary economics are verified, results that highlight the 
lack of effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission through the interest 
rate channel on the real sector in Romania. The poor performance of this 
transmission channel may be caused by the inflexibility of the real sector 
regarding the monetary changes/shocks, as a result of the structural causes 
behind the economic development.  
In order to get a more complete picture of the effectiveness of the interest 
rate channel we extended the analysis on the correlations between the monetary 
policy interest rate and the average interest rate for loans in lei (ron) granted on 
the interbank market (Robor) at different terms of one month, three months and 
one year.  
The following graphics (Figures 4, 5 and 6) reveal that the ROBOR 1M-
12M rates followed a descending trend starting with the third quarter of 2009, 
as the descending evolution of the interbank quotes is also reflected in the 
dynamics of the average interest rates on deposits and credits (they had a 
similar evolution – Figure 3). 
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Figure 4. Robor 1M and the monetary policy interest rate Inflation Targeting in the Romanian Banking Brushwood 
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Figure 5. Robor 3M and the monetary policy interest rate 
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Figure 6. Robor 12M and the monetary policy interest rate 
 
A particularity of the analysed time interval is the fact that it covers two 
periods: (i) a period of sustained economic expansion that begun in 2000, 
accompanied by a decrease of the interbank interest rates – due to a continuous 
process of disinflation and the downward trends of the risk premium and the 
nominal appreciation of the domestic currency, but also by the gradual 
intensification of competition in the banking sector (gaining market shares is 
one of the main objectives of the credit institutions); (ii) the second part of the Georgiana Balaban, Dorel Ailenei 
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analysed period of time is characterized by an increasing trend of the interbank 
interest rates, which reflected deterioration of the inflation evolution under the 
influence of powerful economic and financial shocks on foreign and domestic 
markets and the subsequent rapid growth of the risk premium in the context of a 
deepening global financial and economic crisis and the accelerated spread of its 
effects on the Romanian economy. This was associated with a radical change in 
the behaviour of credit institutions, whose main objective became the 
management of the loan portfolio quality and the structure of balance sheets in 
general. At the end of the analysed period, the interbank yields showed a 
relative normalization, followed by a downward trend. There is a very sharp 
and sudden increase in the Robor rates between September-November 2008, as 
an attempt of the commercial banks to adopt a preventive protection against the 
effects of the global financial and economic crisis propagated in the Romanian 
economy. This episode ended with a determined intervention of the NBR, 
supported by the European Central Bank (ECB), which brought the dynamics of 
the Robor rates on a normal trend. 
In the case of the Granger causality tests on the correlation between the 
monetary policy interest rate and the interbank interest rates (ROBOR 1M, 
ROBOR 3M, ROBOR 12M) similar results are obtained with significant 
nuances on different time dimensions of the interbank credit (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
Granger Robor causality tests (1M, 3M, 12M) – the monetary policy interest rate 
  Null Hypothesis:  Obs  F-Statistic  Probability 
  ROBOR1M does not Granger Cause RD_PM  1294   0.49322   0.61077 
  RD_PM does not Granger Cause ROBOR1M   60.8183   5.8E-26 
  ROBOR3M does not Granger Cause RD_PM  1294   0.51530   0.59744 
  RD_PM does not Granger Cause ROBOR3M   57.7377   9.7E-25 
  ROBOR12M does not Granger Cause RD_PM  1294   0.42746   0.65226 
  RD_PM does not Granger Cause ROBOR12M   57.4768   1.2E-24 
 
The results of the causality tests explain very well why the NBR had to 
turn to other instruments of monetary policy in order to hold back the expansion 
of the consumer credit (tighter credit conditions, improvement of the prudential 
banking regulations etc.).  
Under these circumstances, the econometric equations that describe the 
correlations between the monetary policy interest rate and the average interest 
rates (active and passive), respectively the interbank interest rates (Robor) 
proved to be inconsistent in relation to the significance tests of the coefficients 
associated with the causal variables. Thus, the econometric analysis of the 
causal relationships between interest rates indicates a strong inertia of the Inflation Targeting in the Romanian Banking Brushwood 
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commercial banks that do not cooperate with the central bank in order to ensure 
the stability of the monetary market. Reasons for profit maximization aside, we 
believe that this is largely due to the fact that most commercial banks in 
Romania are subsidiaries of foreign banks and/or with a majority foreign 
capital, thus pursuing the objectives of other economic strategies, foreign to the 
interest of ensuring a financial and monetary stability of the Romanian 
economy. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Based on an increased economic boom, we have witnessed an 
unprecedented increase in lending during the last decade. The econometric 
analysis of the dynamics of the non-government domestic credit in the period 
January 2005-June 2011 revealed its chaotic development in Romania. The 
phenomenon was largely determined by the pressures exercised by the 
commercial banks to relax lending criteria mainly because of a fierce 
competition to increase market share. Furthermore, the monetary expansion 
(M2) sustained the accelerated growth of the non-government domestic credit 
as well. 
Granger causality tests on the interest rates channel have shown a 
sustained effort of the NBR to hold back the credit expansion, but also a quasi-
opacity of the commercial banks system that, more often than not, have ignored 
the signals sent by the monetary authority. We can assert that the 
ineffectiveness of the interest rates channel highlights the need for a strong 
local player (with domestic capital) on the monetary market in Romania, 
respectively the more hostile position rather than cooperating of the commercial 
banks with foreign capital that dominate this market. Far from having a hostile 
attitude towards the foreign capital in the Romanian monetary market, we 
believe that a balance between the foreign and the domestic capital is 
imperative, especially now that the global economic crisis does not seem to 
have come to an end and the international banking system is still recovering. 
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